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Large	economic	benefits	justify	small-firm	loan
guarantees	in	the	Covid-19	crisis
Loan	guarantees	are	a	main	policy	response	during	the	Covid-19	crisis.	These	guarantees	were	also	popular	during
the	Great	Recession,	but	their	demand	from	businesses	in	this	crisis	is	unprecedented.	The	relatively	worse
economic	conditions	undoubtedly	explain	much	of	current	demand,	but	also	possibly	highlight	the	differences	in	the
guarantees’	design	for	each	crisis.	Will	the	new	guarantees	be	cost	effective,	and	what	will	be	their	impact?
Loan	guarantees	provide	credit	access	to	businesses	that	have	no	requisite	collateral	to	access	market	loans.	The
question	of	what	their	effects	are	is	contentious,	however.	Supporters	claim	that	guarantees	alleviate	financial
constraints.	Critics	argue	that	they	increase	participants’	risk-taking	by	allowing	firms	to	borrow	without	pledging
collateral	and	by	providing	lenders	with	a	guarantee.
In	responding	to	critics,	the	loan	guarantee	programs	implemented	during	the	Great	Recession	included	several
design	features	to	curtail	participants’	risk-taking	incentives.
For	example,	in	the	UK	scheme	that	started	in	2009,	lenders	are	incentivised	by	the	partial	guarantees	on	individual
loans	(75%	of	outstanding	balance)	and	by	the	lender-level	caps	on	the	overall	amount	of	guarantees	sought
(9.75%	of	the	scheme’s	size).	Borrowers	are	incentivised	because	they	remain	fully	liable,	and	because	banks	can
request	additional	personal	guarantees.	Borrowers	are	also	charged	a	premium	of	2%	in	addition	to	the	charges	by
lenders	(on	average,	5.8%)	in	order	to	fund	the	scheme.	Perhaps	as	a	result	of	this	premium,	take	up	relative	to	the
target	population	was	low	during	the	Great	Recession	and	has	remained	low	since.	Less	than	£800M	in	loans	were
issued	by	the	scheme	in	2009	to	fewer	than	7,000	companies,	which	corresponds	to	less	than	5%	of	eligible	firms.
By	contrast,	the	loan	guarantees	currently	offered	by	the	UK	government	—	the	Coronavirus	Business	Interruption
Scheme	—	charges	no	premium	to	borrowers,	and	in	addition	provides	12	months	free	of	interest	payments	and	of
any	lender-levied	fees,	although	businesses	remain	fully	liable.	Lenders	cannot	take	personal	guarantees	for	low-
value	loans	(below	£250K),	but	the	overall	cap	for	lenders	remains,	and	so	does	a	slightly	higher	(80%)	loan-level
guarantee.	Perhaps	partly	as	a	result	of	these	new	features,	the	demand	has	been	unprecedented;	in	the	three
weeks	since	the	scheme’s	launch,	more	than	36,000	applications	have	been	completed,	and	15,000	businesses
have	been	approved	for	a	total	of	£2.82B.
What	will	be	the	effects	of	the	new	guarantees?	Despite	the	increasing	prevalence	of	loan	guarantees,	evidence	for
the	success	of	such	schemes	is	still	sparse.	This	is	due,	in	large	part,	to	difficulties	in	accessing	detailed	data	for
small	firms.	But	it	is	also	because	constructing	meaningful	counterfactual	scenarios	is	challenging:	What	would
have	been	the	performance	of	firms	absent	the	guarantees?
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Our	evidence	from	González-Uribe	and	Wang	(2020)	provides	novel	and	useful	insights	for	the	Covid-19	crisis.	In
our	paper,	we	measure	the	effects	of	the	Enterprise	Finance	Guarantee,	the	UK	loan	guarantee	program	that
started	in	2009	as	part	of	the	UK’s	business	policy	response	to	the	Great	Recession.	Our	results	are	consistent	with
the	guarantees	enabling	a	small	group	of	financially	constrained	firms	to	retain	workers	during	the	Great	Recession
who	otherwise	would	have	been	laid	off,	and	whose	retention	was	fundamental	in	rebuilding	the	businesses	post-
recession.
The	estimation	uses	variation	in	participation	from	the	program’s	firm-size	unexpected	eligibility	threshold.	For
eligible	firms	near	the	threshold,	the	guarantees	increased	average	four-year	profits,	productivity,	survival,	and
employment	growth	but	not	investment,	relative	to	non-eligible	firms.	The	relative	increases	in	performance	and
employment	occurred	in	lockstep	with	debt	issuances,	were	absent	prior	to	2009,	did	not	revert	during	2010–2013,
and	mask	large	heterogeneity.	The	results	are	entirely	driven	by	industries	with	high	costs	of	employee	training.
Additional	evidence	suggests	that	these	results	are	mainly	driven	by	effects	on	the	minority	of	eligible	firms	that
take	up	the	scheme.	Under	this	assumption,	annual	returns	to	guaranteed	debt	range	between	16%	and	20%,
which	comfortably	exceed	the	above	market	scheme	rates,	and	are	below	the	cost	of	outside	funding	options.
There	are	three	lessons	from	the	results	in	González-Uribe	and	Wang	(2020)	for	the	Covid-19	crisis.
First,	our	results	show	that	loan	guarantees	can	have	large	economic	benefits	that	justify	their	use	as	policy
responses	during	the	Covid-19	crisis.	In	our	paper,	we	estimate	that	despite	the	low	take-up,	the	economic	benefits
of	guarantees	during	the	Great	Recession	were	1.5	times	their	cost	for	firms	near	the	eligibility	threshold.
Second,	the	findings	suggest	that	loan	guarantee	programs	alone	are	not	enough	to	incentivise	the	retention	of
all	type	of	employees.	During	the	Great	Recession,	firms	used	the	guarantees	only	to	retain	the	types	of	workers
that	could	justify	the	guarantees’	costs.	As	we	have	also	argued	in	Gonzalez-Uribe,	Wang	and	Djankov	(2020),	this
result	implies	that	stimulus	programs	based	on	guarantees	alone	can	be	regressive	because	the	poorer	workers	are
also	the	more	likely	to	have	jobs	with	low	training	costs.	Other	schemes	that	also	target	workers	in	low	training	jobs
who	are	easier	to	replace,	such	as	the	Job	Retention	Scheme,	are	therefore	warranted	to	mitigate	job	losses	during
the	Covid-19	crisis.
Finally,	a	word	of	caution.	While	lower	costs	to	borrowers	and	the	elimination	of	personal	guarantees	will	certainly
help	increase	the	demand	of	guaranteed	loans,	the	downside	of	these	new	features	is	potential	risk-taking	by
borrowers	and/or	lenders	(as	shown	by	Lelarge,	Sraer	and	Thesmar	(2008)	for	the	French	loan	guarantees
implemented	in	the	90s),	as	well	as	the	possibility	of	directing	funds	towards	the	wrong	businesses	and	preventing
efficient	labour	reallocation.	Only	time	will	tell	whether	the	benefits	from	these	new	loan	guarantees	will	compensate
for	the	potential	long-term	difficulties	when	the	loans	come	due	for	repayment	in	the	future.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	“The	Effects	of	Small-Firm	Loan	Guarantees	in	the	UK:	Insights	for	the	COVID-19
Pandemic	Crisis”.
The	post	expresses	the	views	of	its	author(s),	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School
of	Economics.
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